Memory and Feasibility: Why Ethnic Conflicts Happen

Janjaweed Militiamen 

Ethnic rivalries have spawned some of the most vicious conflicts of our time- the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, the Rwandan Genocide and the Second Congo War (the most deadly conflict since the end of World War II) being some of the deadliest. There have been many theories on why they happen from Robert Kaplan's idea of 'ancient hatreds' to instrumentalist accounts of ethnic groups vying for power. 

Recently, there has been an increasing recognition that both ethnic identity and nationalism are reasonably modern and very malleable. As such research into ethnic conflict has proceeded along two lines: an 'identity' stream associated with sociological ideas such as memory, the construction of identity/barriers to identity etc. and a 'feasibility' stream associated with conflict studies which looks at whether parties have the resources to commit to such conflicts. 

I want to unpack some key ideas from both lines of study, before drawing some very tentative conclusions.

'Every Foetus is a Croat': Ethno-national Identities as a Source of Conflict

I use ethnicity here to mean any group of people who identify with each other as having a common heritage, with barriers to group entry meaning anyone cannot just declare themselves a member of that group (heritages are often deeply fictitious but often involve shared myths, language, customs etc.). In ethnic conflict, the key aim of the actors who are driving for ethnic conflict (e.g. Milosevic, Tudjman etc) is to both legitimate their own violent actions and delegitimise ethnic 'others'. In constructing a frame of mind for collective action I theorise that there are three components (after Gamson): injustice, identity and agency.

Injustice

Injustice is constructed by reframing collective memory to make past events into reasons to hate the 'others', either by playing up differences or blaming events on others (e.g. Milosevic blaming bad financial circumstances on Bosnians and bringing back images of World War II Croatian-aligned fascists etc). This triggers what cognitive psychologists call “hot cognition” where language or symbols trigger an emotional response via a series of associations. I would like to note I do not mean 'collective memory' in the sense used by Carl Jung to refer to a collective unconscious- what I mean here is the social framework through which ethnically conscious individuals can organise their identity.

Milosevic Addressing the National Assembly

As previously noted in a post about the Marketplace for Ideas, Price in his ‘Market for Loyalties’ propounded the strategy of attempting to monopolise the construction of collective memory by dominating media discourses, where a government may use “regulation of communications to organise a cartel of imagery”. It has often been a strategy of national governments in particular (but also other groups e.g. the Interahamwe in Rwanda) to monopolise the media in order to induce a sort of 'war psychosis' whereby a group will feel they are surrounded by enemies who are trying to wipe them out. 

Identity

Actors may also seek to emphasise ethnic difference, for example by forms of 'state chauvinism', including enshrining a national religion or language, or as suggested by this section's title, banning abortion to create more "fighting Croats". Often, previous economic differences are emphasised e.g. between the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda. For example, the Croatian government actively tried to turn Croatians on their neighbours, especially in areas outside of the Croatian republic proper, which had historically been harmonious.

Agency

Stressing agency is also a vital factor. Governments or rebel groups often imply a sense of being able to solve the ‘problem’ as a group and deny the “immutability of some undesirable situation” (Gamson). They seek to construct the collective memory to express the embodiment of individual agency only through the collective of the nation. Appeals to collective solidarity are particularly common, for example Serb People’s Council calls on the Serb people to resist the terror of the Ustashoid government” and “Protecting Serbs from the vampirical Ustashe” (Ustashe being the Croatian World War II Nazi-aligned government).

In all, ethnic difference is clearly an important factor and is often constructed around injustice, identity and agency. Interestingly, in a 2009 study by Collier it was found that ethnic polarisation was the only socio-political variable found to be a predictor of civil conflicts of any kind.

'A Spiral of Silence': Feasibility and Conflict

 However, this isn't a complete explanation for why ethnic conflict goes on- it does little to discuss what the incentives of certain groups to actually declare war might be. So, I am going to borrow from a broader series of studies on civil conflict to discuss how feasibility, that is having the resources to actually fight a war is important to understanding even ethnic conflicts. 

In Collier's study five feasibility factors are particularly important to triggering conflict: terrain, foreign support and an abundance of young males and resources. 

Terrain

Terrain tends to be more relevant when the conflict is between a civil insurgency and the government who are both ethnically different (e.g. Kurds v Turkish government) rather than the government or some other group slaughtering innocent civilians. In those cases, mountains and forests are relatively good predictors of all kinds of civil conflict as they make guerilla warfare significantly easier. 

Foreign Support

Foreign support comes in all different sources- sometimes ethnic actors are backed by foreign governments for ideological or realpolitik reasons, diasporas are a key to funding many ethnic military groups or armies (particularly the Jewish and until recently Tamil diasporas) and other organisations (often religious). 

It is particularly important in terms of conflict-specific capital e.g. weapons stocks to fight the war and keep military forces equipped.

Young Males

Particularly in impoverished countries, young men are often either the main source of productive labour or the main source of soldiers. Hence, when returns to labour are low, this increases their drive to be soldiers in a conflict (this is also a partial explanation for the relationship between economic conditions and the incidence of ethnic conflict).

Poverty and inequality both induce disadvantaged young males to fight against those they see as 'oppressors'. Further, there are many opportunists who seek financial rewards in such conflicts- one side or another may be the only way of providing for a family- particularly if the conflict itself is making other economic activity too risky.

Overwhelming support also leads to what the title of this section refers to, which is the idea that a strong ability to enforce an opinion may suppress a minority viewpoint or one held by a weaker group because any individuals in that group or minority will not speak out. This was particularly used by ETA to convince wavering Basques to support their cause.

Resource Curse Redux

Resources cause all kinds of curses, but in this case there are two particularly important ones: military financing and increased motive. Resources obviously provide a way of getting military capital- particularly if countries are able to trade petroleum for guns and other hardware, often in violation of sanctions. It also changes the motives of ethnic insurgents in particular- if an ethnic group can control the country it now has more to gain economically.

Thus, feasibility is an important component to any conflict, even ethnic ones.

Some Tentative Conclusions

Ethnic conflict is obviously a very complex issue- it goes beyond any 'ancient hatreds' Kaplan chooses to dream up and is rooted in issues of history, identity and feasibility of conflict. In particular, I have examined how groups construct ethnic (and often ethno-national) differences to legitimise conflict and how feasibility plays an important role in sparking and enabling conflict.

How do we go forward? Other nations should be careful in how they deal with ethnic conflict. For example, in the Yugoslav case it was almost certainly a mistake to give the nations a right to self-determination as this led to the collapse of a previously multi-ethnic state into warring ethnic factions- more work should have been done to keep a post-Communist Yugoslavia together. Preventative diplomacy may help in some cases, but it is my personal belief that military intervention may often be necessary where practical (justified under either R2P if you so choose or UNSC sanction). Enforcing sanctions is vital, particularly on military equipment (though this is difficult if the supplier is the PRC or Russia). In some cases, states may want to fund or support pro-democracy movements (though this comes with its own problems- are they tainted by Western funding?). More generally, Western nations in particular need to be more proactive at dealing with conflict and not sitting back and watch it pan out and either intervening at the last minute or not at all.

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Dan Gibbons is a third year Bachelor of Commerce (Economics) student at the University of Melbourne. He has a forthcoming publication in Intergraph: A Journal of Dialogic Anthropology (about memory and nationalism) and is currently submitting papers on the rise of modern consumerism, the role of criminology theory in literary criticism and the institutional theory of nationalism. Dan is a keen debater and public speaker.